Brexit

Started by Imconfused, June 22, 2016, 01:58:16 PM

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Imconfused

Quote from: VoteQuimby on June 24, 2016, 06:39:24 AM
I'm confused why it's the left's mantra to think not being retarded is racist? It seems like any intelligent economic move or interest in one's country is racist now? Why would you want to be forced to be tied to a bunch of shitty economic things and rules?



Ah,  the evil white men,  again.  This is getting stale.

THESE PRETZELS ARE MAKING ME THIRSTY!




Imconfused

The good thing about all this is that now,  when Britain is out,  it'll leave them more money to spend on the rapefugees.

edit:

also this bitch resigned. 




chefist

Quote from: VoteQuimby on June 24, 2016, 06:39:24 AM
I'm confused why it's the left's mantra to think not being retarded is racist? It seems like any intelligent economic move or interest in one's country is racist now? Why would you want to be forced to be tied to a bunch of shitty economic things and rules?



When you lose your argument, the other side is automatically a racist or nazi...

ItsOver

Quote from: Imconfused on June 24, 2016, 06:19:29 AM
I sure wasn't ready for the EU to get it up the ass like this.  I'm still in a shock.

It's a nice day today,  people,  let's celebrate.
F U EU.  Take that, "New World Order."





Quote from: Imconfused on June 24, 2016, 08:29:49 AM
;D

They had to get out of the EU, the UK was on the hook for millions of Turkroaches emigrating to their country.

No one wants that.


Imconfused


Juan

My local Harris Teeter supermarket is so white that the largest amount of shelf space in the World Foods section is English Food.  Maybe I'll go buy something.

TigerLily

Quote from: VoteQuimby on June 24, 2016, 06:39:24 AM
I'm confused why it's the left's mantra to think not being retarded is racist? It seems like any intelligent economic move or interest in one's country is racist now? Why would you want to be forced to be tied]to a bunch of shitty economic things and rules?

Wow. I had no idea Bellgab was so full of people who are so passionate about international political economics.  Just to help with the celebratory mood, I found this fascinating article I'm sure all of you who care so deeply about the ramifications and consequences of Brexit

I would have posted this in the International Ecomics thread but couldn't find it  ??? 

So the following article takes care of the shitty economic things As far as the shitty rules Don't worry all you Political Science junkies.  I found a great article for you too.  I would post it in the European Union Political Policies thread but couldn't find that either :-\. Must have a different title   Stand By.   :D

And Congratulations on your awesome Win. I'm sure your British brethren would be touched and thrilled by your deep concern for their welfare. Britain First!  :D  :D   :D

Abstract
This study suggests UK equivalent variation (EV) gains of â,¬8.9 billion on withdrawal from the EU budget. Factoring in associated trade facilitation costs from the loss of UK access to the single market, annual UK EV losses could be as high as â,¬14.0 billion, with the EU-28 facing a corresponding loss of â,¬40.4 billion. Interestingly, the extrapolated UK gain arising from withdrawal from the ‘CAP’ component of the EU budget exceeds estimated lower and upper bound trade facilitation costs exclusively on EU agrofood trade. Accordingly, the UK should realistically remain as an EU member, although continue to lobby for reductions in the CAP budget.



1 Introduction
In May 2015, the UK Conservative party won a general election and Prime Minister, David Cameron, has pledged a renegotiation of the UK/EU relationship, which is to be put to an ‘inâ€"out’ referendum by the end of 2017. Fuelled by the current sway of UK public opinion,2 the real possibility of a Brexit3 is already under the spotlight (CER, 2014; Swinbank, 2014; Matthews, 2015). For the UK, a Brexit presents a trade-off between reduced single market access in exchange for greater freedom from the regulatory, legal and fiscal obligations which accompany EU membership. In this context, CER (2014) and Matthews (2015) concur that a free trade area (FTA) would be the optimal strategy for the UK government to pursue.4 The loss of single market access associated with an FTA would be accompanied by a rise in trade costs to both partners with the re-introduction of customs controls, border checks and emerging certification and regulatory divergences between EU and UK authorities. Matthews (2015) also maintains that an open economy such as the UK would not favour rises in existing EU common external tariffs (CETs), whilst one can only speculate on the time frame or magnitude of any hypothesised tariff reductions. Interestingly, Matthews (2015) also observes that, ‘Filling (the) gap in the EU budget (from UK withdrawal) would require either expenditure reductions or larger contributions by the remaining member states’.

In the light of the remark about the possible end of the romance between the EU and the UK by the European Commission's President, Claude Juncker,5 we assess quantitatively both the budgetary and macro-economic impacts for EU Member States from the establishment of a UK-EU FTA. Under such uncertainty, the paper does not consider changes to the UK's import tariff structure, although sensitivity analysis is conducted in relation to the expected rise in trade costs.


2 Methodology and Data
The current paper follows the computable general equilibrium (CGE) methodology and data employed in Boulanger and Philippidis (2015).6 Time series data by Member State are taken from the Clearance Audit Trail System (CATS) database of the European Commission which includes an inventory of all Pillar 1 and 2 agricultural support payments and full coverage of Pillar 2 co-financing rates by Member State. These data are employed to recalibrate version 8.1 of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) dataset benchmarked to 2007 and implement a detailed ‘CAP baseline’ (see next section). To complete the EU budget, historical and projected data on total EU budgetary expenditure (i.e. cohesion policy, fisheries, etc.) by Member State are taken from EC (2015a,b). A perceived advantage of a multi-region CGE representation is that within a theoretically consistent microâ€"macro system, one can fully measure the economy-wide feedback effects resulting from (i) changing net income flows arising from projected expenditures from, and endogenous Member State contributions (or ‘own resources’) to, the EU budget, and (ii) the disruption to gross bilateral trade flows from reduced trade facilitation. To this end, the Modular Agricultural GeNeral Equilibrium Tool (MAGNET) (Woltjer and Kuiper, 2014) is employed, incorporating state-of-the-art modelling for agricultural sectors. This study modifies the accounting equations to differentiate between Pillar 1 (i.e. ‘decoupled’; ‘coupled direct payments’; ‘market measures’; ‘additional direct transfers’; ‘other EAGF payments’; ‘agri-monetary transfers’); Pillar 2 (Axis 1â€"3; Leader; technical assistance) and an aggregate of EU policy (non-CAP) receipts. Furthermore, as noted, further modelling modifications are made to accommodate ‘own resources’, the UK rebate and the ‘rebates on the rebate’.7


3 Aggregation, Closure and Scenario Design
The study disaggregates 10 EU members which constitute 80% of CAP spending (France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Romania, Spain and the UK) whilst a further five EU members are disaggregated (Austria, Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden and Croatia) to explicitly model the rebate mechanisms and Croatia's accession. The remaining EU members are aggregated, whilst residual trade and production flows are captured within a rest of the world region. The sectorial aggregation focuses on five broad sectors: agriculture (cereals, oilseeds, other crops, livestock, raw sugar and milk); food activities (meat, dairy, processed sugar, other food processing); manufacturing; services and raw materials. Neoclassical model closure equates withdrawals (savings and imports) with injections (investment and exports), whilst in the EU regions this accounting identity is modified to include payments to (i.e. withdrawals), and receipts from (i.e. injections), the EU budget.

A ‘business-as-usual’ (BAU) scenario covers two time periods (2007â€"2013 and 2013â€"2020) which reconcile the multiannual financial framework (MFF) with Croatia's accession to the EU. Furthermore, under article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, upon notifying the EU of an intention to withdraw membership, an exit agreement must be drawn up within a 2-year period. Thus, at the earliest, a Brexit would not occur before 2020 (Matthews, 2015). Following Boulanger and Philippidis (2015), in the first period (2007â€"2013), historical data are employed to calculate shocks to capture changes in real GDP, population, land productivity, EU CAP and non-CAP related receipts, whilst EU tariffs are unilaterally removed under the Everything But Arms (EBA) agreement.8 The second period (2013â€"2020) employs projected data shocks for real GDP, population and land productivities, whilst in accordance with the 2013 political agreement (European Council, 2013), Pillar 1 and 2 payment cuts of 13% and 18% are imposed. Non-CAP payments by Member State for 2020 are based on projected data for the EU-28.9 As a new member of the EU, Croatia's imports are also subject to the EBA agreement; all EU-Croatian tariffs are eliminated, the EU CET is extended to Croatia, and non-EU country tariffs on Croatian exports are targeted to the average applied rates on EU-27 exports.

In addition to the BAU shocks, scenario 1 examines a UK nationalisation of existing agricultural and non-agricultural payments whilst under conditions of a UK-EU FTA, assuming that intra-EU tariffs remain at zero, and that the UK continues to adopt the EU CET on extra-EU trade imports. An additional two scenarios contemplate associated increases in trade costs on all trade. A literature review conducted by Francois et al. (2005) reveals cost savings from trade facilitation within the EU of between 2% and 5% of the value of trade (p. 361). Hornok and Koren (2015) concur, suggesting EU trade facilitation costs of 5%. Accordingly, scenarios 2 and 3 assume trade cost increases of 2% (lower limit) and 5% (upper limit), modelled as ‘iceberg’ costs.10

a final observation, agricultural and rural development related expenditures by 2020 account for approximately one-third of EU budgetary spending, which in money metric terms results in a net gain from ‘CAP budget’ withdrawal of approximately â,¬2.5 billion.17 Compared with a BAU, further simulations (not shown) reveal that by 2020, the EV cost to the UK exclusively associated with the loss of single agrofood market access, is between â,¬589 million (2% trade costs) and â,¬1.437 billion (5% trade costs).


5 Conclusions
In 2015, the EU is still feeling the economic effects of the financial crisis, which has also transformed the political landscape fuelling anti-austerity politics (e.g. Greece, Spain) and even anti-EU sentiment (e.g. UK, France). Under the conditions of a UK-EU FTA scenario, the UK could, at best, make a small real income gain, although this quickly disappears under conditions of higher assumed trade facilitation costs arising from the loss of single market access, with the UK recording an upper bound loss of 0.67% of UK per capita real income. All experiments show that economic consequences will be felt in the remaining EU-27 Member States. A similar result is obtained in a CGE study of Brexit by Ottaviano et al. (2014), where UK welfare losses range between 1.13% (‘optimistic scenario’) and 3.09% (‘pessimistic scenario’).18 The relatively large UK loss reported in their ‘pessimistic’ experiment is, at least in part, explained by the imposition of Most Favoured Nation tariffs on UK/EU trade, which is not contemplated in our scenarios.

Interestingly, narrowing our results to only encompass the agri-food trade and (extrapolated) CAP budgetary implications, reveals that this element of Brexit would be unequivocally beneficial to the UK (i.e. net gains from ‘CAP’ budget withdrawal exceed even the upper bound losses arising from trade facilitation costs on agrofood single market access).

It should be noted that with such uncertainty surrounding Brexit, one must employ reasonable scenario assumptions. Entertaining the many possible deviations from existing assumptions (e.g. UK trade policy, UK expenditure on support programmes hitherto under the auspices of the EU), or even adjacent events (i.e. TTIP, Grexit), gives rise to numerous hypothetical outcomes, which go beyond the scope of this study. Notwithstanding, in macro-economic terms, the consensus seems to favour continued membership of the EU, although the stance traditionally taken by the UK government for a smaller CAP budget, appears to be justified.

End of a Romance? A Note on the Quantitative Impacts of a ‘Brexit’ from the EU

Pierre Boulanger andGeorge Philippidis†
Version of Record online: 18 AUG 2015

DOI: 10.1111/1477-9552.12120

© 2015 The Agricultural Economics Society

Imconfused

Quote from: Juan on June 24, 2016, 09:15:51 AM
My local Harris Teeter supermarket is so white that the largest amount of shelf space in the World Foods section is English Food.  Maybe I'll go buy something.

heh heh

VtaGeezer

The chances of a "NAFTex" referendum being held in the Land of the Free so the people could speak? Zip. Zilch. Nada. 

Imconfused

Shit might happen now.  Give it some time.  It's just started.



Be patient. 

WOTR

Quote from: VtaGeezer on June 24, 2016, 09:25:35 AM
The chances of a "NAFTex" referendum being held in the Land of the Free so the people could speak? Zip. Zilch. Nada.
I believe that the people are a decade and a half too late to worry about NAFTA.  Those jobs have already migrated into (and then out of) Mexico.  GE and others moved lots of production to Mexico a long time ago... But they were still too expensive and most of the jobs moved to China (and Vietnam, and Indonesia.)

I assume that it is the jobs more than the resources that upset you (softwood lumber, anyone?) 

VtaGeezer

Quote from: Imconfused on June 24, 2016, 09:29:52 AM
Shit might happen now.  Give it some time.  It's just started.

Be patient.


WOTR

Quote from: WOTR on June 23, 2016, 09:16:07 PM
1.348 right now... Closer to the close of the polls it may have been "fish in a barrel..."  Right now, I see a bounce coming (enough to shake a few people out.)  After that?  Probably more decline- but if the old "buy the rumour, sell the news" holds true, I would be a little leery.

I'm not saying that I would buy the pound (I'm not dumb), but usually there is a bounce somewhere to scare people a little (and leverage in currency markets usually scares the little guy pretty easily.)
Pretty close to calling the bottom of 1.328.  We now have a bouce, and I still suspect that the coming days we will see a drop.  The major factor that may be overlooked... They still have the Bank of England.  Kind of like the Fed... How much will they spend (and for how long) to keep their currency where they want it and meet their target?

ItsOver

Quote from: Camazotz Automat on June 24, 2016, 09:39:24 AM
Somewhere, Ian Fleming is smiling.

007 is locked and loaded...




chefist

Quote from: WOTR on June 24, 2016, 09:34:54 AM
I believe that the people are a decade and a half too late to worry about NAFTA.  Those jobs have already migrated into (and then out of) Mexico.  GE and others moved lots of production to Mexico a long time ago... But they were still too expensive and most of the jobs moved to China (and Vietnam, and Indonesia.)

I assume that it is the jobs more than the resources that upset you (softwood lumber, anyone?)

There are always opportunities for new factories and repatriation of manufacturing back into the US. As the cost of labor rises in China, many jobs have been moved to Mexico. If the right trade deals are made and beneficial tax laws introduced, then more and more companies will locate in the US.

I'm optimistic about the future.

Imconfused

Quote from: WOTR on June 24, 2016, 09:41:06 AM
Pretty close to calling the bottom of 1.328.  We now have a bouce, and I still suspect that the coming days we will see a drop.  The major factor that may be overlooked... (((They))) still have the Bank of England.  Kind of like the Fed... How much will they spend (and for how long) to keep their currency where they want it and meet their target?

FIFY

ziznak

and all this time I thought you guys were talking about the ebonic pronounciation of breakfast!

Oh shit boys and girls, France, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands are calling for referendums to leave the EU.

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-outers-all-idUSKCN0ZA2LP


Imconfused

Quote from: (((The King of Kings))) on June 24, 2016, 09:57:24 AM
Oh shit boys and girls, France, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands are calling for referendums to leave the EU.

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-outers-all-idUSKCN0ZA2LP

Yes,  we have Frexit,  Dexit, Swexit and the most popular of all - Netherladexit.

Now take that!



I can't imagine why the UK voted to leave.

Imconfused

I have no idea.




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